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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to an order of the 
Utah Supreme Court transferring jurisdiction under the authority of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, LC and White Investment Co., 
Inc. (collectively, "Appellants") own the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the "Shopping 
Center") located at approximately 3300 East 3300 South in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Defendant/Appellant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc. ("Wendy's") 
owns and operates a restaurant on a parcel within the Shopping Center (the "Wendy's 
Property"). This case concerns the location of a drive-through lane and related facilities (the 
"Drive-Through Facilities") associated with the Wendy's Property. 
Course of Proceedings 
This action was originally filed by Metropolitan Square Associates ("Metropolitan 
Square") on July 30, 2004. [R. at 1.] Metropolitan Square's Complaint alleged that the 
Drive-Through Facilities constituted a trespass with respect to the Shopping Center and a 
breach of contract with respect to the Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements (the 
"Declaration") governing the Shopping Center. [R. at 2-4.] Metropolitan Square sought an 
order requiring Wendy's to remove the Drive-Through Facilities and unspecified monetary 
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damages. [R. at 4.] In its Answer, Wendy's denied Metropolitan Square's allegations. 
Wendy's also and asserted counterclaims for: (1) a declaratory judgment to the effect that 
Wendy's is entitled to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location; (2) 
recognition of a prescriptive easement in Wendy's favor pursuant to which Wendy's is 
entitled to maintain and use the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location; and (3) an 
injunction barring Metropolitan Square from interfering with Wendy's' right to use and 
maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 15-60.] 
Following some discovery, Metropolitan Square filed an Amended Complaint, which 
substituted Appellants as plaintiffs and alleged that Wendy's' menu-board signs (the "Menu-
Board Signs") also constitute a breach of the Declaration. [R. at 78-87, 102-03.] 
Wendy's filed a motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2005. [R. at 114-
16.] After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered a Minute Entry on 
December 12,2005 granting Wendy's' motion. [R. at 307-10.] The trial court subsequently 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final Judgment dismissing all of 
Appellant's Amended Complaint and all causes of action asserted therein. [R. at 375-83; 
3 84-87.] The trial court's Final Judgment stated that the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-
Board Signs are permitted by the Declaration and may remain in place, enjoined Appellants 
from interfering with Wendy's use and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and 
Menu-Board Signs, and awarded Wendy's its costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$19,516.50. [R. at 384-87.] This appeal followed. [R. at 397-99.] 
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Statement of Facts 
The Wendy's Property is located within the Shopping Center owned by Appellants. 
[R. at 376.] Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the property 
described in the Declaration, recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on 
September 24, 1982 as entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823. [R. at 376.] The 
Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the property described therein. 
[R. at 376.] The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration refers to as "Parcel 
Three." [R. at 376.] Plaintiff/Appellant White Investment, Inc. owns parcels one and two, 
and American Stores Properties, Inc. ("ASPI") leases Parcel One from White Investment, 
Inc. [R. at 30-32.] 
The Wendy's property was developed as a Burger King restaurant by The Boyer 
Company in or about 1982. [R. at 376.] At that time, a drive-through lane was constructed 
on the north side of the Wendy's Property. [R. at 377.] The drive-through lane is bounded 
on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south 
by the restaurant (the drive-through lane and related island are referred to herein as the 
"Drive-Through Facilities"). [R. at 377.] The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the 
northwest corner of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what 
is defined by the Declaration as the "Common Area." [R. at 377.] The Plot Plan shows the 
Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines running from the northwest corner of the 
restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast. [R. at 377.] Although the Plot 
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Plan does not purport to be a survey, the physical relationship between the restaurant building 
and drive-through lane as shown on the Plot Plan is generally consistent in scale with the 
actual location of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property and the Drive-Through 
Facilities. [R. at 120; Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 6 (noting alleged differences of 
a few feet between the actual location of the restaurant and the restaurant as shown on the 
Plot Plan).] From the time they were constructed in or about 1982 through the present, the 
Drive-Through Facilities have remained in continuous use in the same location and 
configuration. [R. at 378.] 
In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of the Wendy's Property, 
and an arrow sign located on the Drive-Through Facilities, Wendy's also maintains two 
additional menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property (referred to herein as the "Menu-Board 
Signs"). [R. at 378.] Menu-board signs have existed on the Wendy's Property continuously 
since 1982. [R. at 378.] The Menu-Board Signs are approximately the same size as those 
that have existed on the Wendy's Property since 1982. [R. at 122.] The Menu-Board Signs 
are in approximately the same location as those that have existed on the Wendy's Property 
since 1982. [R. at 123.] The Menu-Board Signs are configured in approximately the same 
way as those that have existed on the Wendy's Property since 1982. [R. at 123.] The Menu-
Board Signs have approximately the same appearance as those that have existed on the 
Wendy's Property since 1982. [R. at 123.] Menu-board signs like the Menu-Board Signs 
are essential to the operation of drive-through restaurants. [R. at 378.] 
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With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that 
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be 
located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan, without the prior 
written consent of the Owner of Parcel Two and ASPI, including consent to 
the location of the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility. 
Such consent will not be unreasonably withheld provided that the location of 
such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or inhibit access to and from the 
conduct of business from the buildings in the Shopping Center or access to and 
from the adjacent streets. 
[R. at 38.] With respect to "Common Area," the Declaration provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking, 
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e., the 
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers, 
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business 
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center (i.e., the owners 
of the property to which the Declaration pertains), and for the servicing and 
supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise provided herein . . . . No 
building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed within 
the Common Area on any parcel except loading and delivery docks and 
covered areas attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outside storage areas 
. . . pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and directional signs, bumper 
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting 
standards, driveways, sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars 
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required 
under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental 
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and 
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are 
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the Declaration 
as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the 
Plot Plan. 
[R. at 32-33; 377-78.] Relatedly, with respect to passage over the Common Area, the 
Declaration states that 
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Each Owner, as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such Owner, 
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the benefit of each 
of such other Owners and their respective tenants, employees, agents, 
customers and invitees of such tenants, and for the benefit of each parcel 
owned by such grantee, a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each parcel 
owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic and for vehicular parking upon, over and across the Common Area 
within each parcel or parcels owned by the grantor. 
[R. at 34-35.] 
The Declaration also establishes maintenance obligations in and about the Common 
Area: 
Each owner, at its own expense, shall maintain the area designated as Common 
Area Only on the Plot Plan and located on its parcel at all times in good and 
clean condition and repair, which maintenance shall include, but not be limited 
to the following: 
(b) Removing all papers, debris, filth, refuse, snow, ice and water and 
thoroughly sweeping the area to the extent reasonably necessary to keep 
the area in a clean and orderly condition; 
(c) Placing, keeping in repair, and replacing any necessary appropriate 
directional signs, markers and lines; . . . . 
[R. at 36-37.] 
With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct two (2) free-
standing pylon, monument or other signs at the location designated on the Plot 
Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, monument or other free-standing 
sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written approval of 
all Owners . . . . 
[R. at 39-40; 378.] 
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The Declaration provides that in the event legal proceedings are brought to enforce 
any provision of the Declaration as against any party with an interest in the property 
described therein, the successful party in the action shall be entitled to recover "a reasonable 
sum as attorneys' fees and costs" from the other party. [R. at 378-79.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly interpreted the Declaration to expressly permit Wendy's5 
maintenance and use of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs in their current 
configuration and location. The Declaration expressly permits drive-through restaurants as 
shown on the Plot Plan sketch. Although not drawn to scale, the Plot Plan depicts the Drive-
Through Facilities in their present location. Even if the Declaration did not expressly permit 
the Drive-Through Facilities, Appellants could consent to their location. Appellants' 
acquiescence to the location and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities for more than 
two decades amounts to consent. In any event, it would be unreasonable for Appellants to 
withhold their consent to the Drive-Through Facilities and, according to the Declaration, they 
may not do so. 
While the Declaration prohibits certain types of signage, "directional" signs are 
expressly permitted on the Wendy's Property. Unlike the forbidden billboard-type signs, the 
Menu-Board Signs are directional inasmuch as they direct traffic and instruct customers on 
the procedure for placing orders. Even if not considered directional signs, the Menu-Board 
Signs are nonetheless implicitly permitted by the Declaration. Indeed, the Declaration 
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provides for the operation of a drive-through restaurant on the Wendy's Property, and menu-
board signs are a normal and necessary incident of such restaurants. Interpreting the 
Declaration to allow a drive-through restaurant, but at the same time to forbid the necessary 
signage would be an error. 
The Court need not address Appellants' argument that the Drive-Through Facilities 
constitute a continuing trespass for purposes of the relevant statutes of limitation because 
Wendy's' maintenance and use of the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly permitted by 
the Declaration. Even if the Drive-Through Facilities could be considered a trespass, 
however, they are permanent in nature and the statute of limitation expired almost two 
decades ago. Given that the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly permitted by the 
Declaration, the trial court correctly enjoined Appellants from interfering with or removing 
them. 
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs in Wendy's' favor should be 
affirmed because Appellants' argument that they are not a "defaulting Owner or party" 
against whom an award can be made is raised for the first time on appeal. In any event, 
Appellants' assertion of baseless, untimely claims against Wendy's was a breach of the 
Declaration entitling Wendy's to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Moreover, each 
claim with respect to which the trial court entered an award of attorneys' fees and costs was 
based on the Declaration and, therefore, compensable. There was consequently no need for 
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Wendy's to allocate its attorneys' fees and costs between compensable and non-compensable 
claims as Appellants contend. 
ARGUMENT 
The Declaration is a contract like any other, and consequently, the interpretation of 
the Declaration is a question of law. See Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Investment 
Management, LLC, 2006 UT App 331, T( 14, P.3d . The trial court correctly 
interpreted the Declaration to expressly permit Wendy's' maintenance and use of the Drive-
Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs in their current configuration and location. Based 
on its proper interpretation of the Declaration, the trial court also correctly ruled that 
Appellants may not interfere with or remove the Drive-Through Facilities or the Menu-Board 
Signs. This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's Final Judgment. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE 
DECLARATION TO PERMIT THE DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES 
The trial court correctly concluded that "[although the Declaration generally forbids 
the construction of improvements on common areas [of the Shopping Center], it expressly 
authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on Parcel Three as shown on the Plot Plan." [R. 
at 380.] The trial court's decision has ample support in the record, was correct as a matter 
of law, and should be affirmed. 
A. The Declaration Expressly Permits the Drive-Through Facilities. 
With respect to drive-through facilities generally, the Declaration provides in relevant 
part that "[n]o building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located 
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on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan . . . ." [R. at 38; 377.] Thus, so long as 
the Plot Plan shows a "building featuring . . . drive-through traffic" on Parcel Three, the 
Declaration expressly authorizes such facilities. This conclusion is supported by the fact that 
the Declaration clearly contemplates, and again, expressly permits, improvements such as the 
Drive-Through Facilities: 
No building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed 
within the Common Area on any parcel except. . . directional signs, bumper 
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting 
standards, driveways . . . as may be required under applicable laws, rules, 
ordinances and regulations of any governmental body having jurisdiction over 
the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and vehicular traffic patterns for the 
areas of the Shopping Center which are designated "Common Area Only" on 
the Plot Plan shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the Plot 
Plan. 
[R. at 33.] 
The Plot Plan attached to the Declaration does indeed show a building featuring a 
drive-through lane on Parcel Three. [R. at 52.] Parcel Three is located in the lower right 
area of the Plot Plan. [R. at 52.] The Wendy's Property appears in the lower left area of 
Parcel Three as a rectangle. [R. at 52.] The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities 
as two curved lines running from the northwest comer of the rectangle to the northeast onto 
the Common Area of the Shopping Center. [R. at 52.] Appellants do not dispute that the 
Drive-Through Facilities are physically located in the general location shown on the Plot 
Plan. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 16 (quoting expert, Mark Babbitt).] 
Moreover, the trial court found that u[t]he Drive Through Facilities extend from the 
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northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what 
is defined by the Declaration as the 'Common Area' of the Shopping Center." [R. at 377.] 
Consequently, the Declaration does expressly permit the Drive-Through Facilities. 
Appellants contend that because the actual physical location of the Drive-Through 
Facilities differs by a few feet from the location shown on the Plot Plan, the Drive-Through 
Facilities are not permitted by the Declaration. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 14.] 
Appellants' argument fails to account for the fact that the Plot Plan is neither an "as 
constructed" drawing nor a precise survey of the Shopping Center. The Plot Plan itself is 
labeled a "Proposed Site Plan." [R. at 52.] Appellants' expert, Mark Babbitt, so testified and 
added his opinion that the Plot Plan "is indicative of a preliminary layout, not as a 
constructed drawing or a survey." [R. at 280.] Mr. Babbitt's opinion is bolstered by the fact 
that the Plot Plan is clearly not drawn to scale, includes no dimensions, and purports to be 
nothing more than a sketch of the Shopping Center. [R. at 52.] Given that the Plot Plan was 
obviously not intended to be an exact diagram of the Shopping Center, it is hardly surprising 
that the precise location of the Wendy's Property and the Drive-Through Facilities differs 
slightly from the location shown on the Plot Plan.1 
Since some variability between a not-to-scale sketch and reality is to be expected, the 
drafters of the Declaration must have anticipated and intended to permit drive-through 
inasmuch as the Plot Plan does not purport to be drawn to scale and includes no 
dimensions, Mr. Babbitt's comparison of the Plot Plan and reality cannot possibly be as 
precise as the measurements he claims to have made would suggest. 
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facilities in the general location shown on the Plot Plan without regard to precise 
measurements. Had the drafters genuinely been concerned about the exact location of drive-
through facilities, they would surely have attached a considerably more detailed survey or 
map to the Declaration than the Plot Plan. As it is undisputed and indisputable that the Plot 
Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities extending from the northwest corner of the Wendy's 
Property to the northeast and onto the Common Area, and the Drive-Through Facilities are, 
in fact, so located, the Declaration expressly provides for such Drive-Through Facilities in 
their present location. Again, that there may be some slight variation between the Plot Plan 
and reality is to be expected and in any event is so small as to be immaterial. The trial court's 
decision to grant Wendy's' motion for summary judgment was, therefore, correct and should 
be affirmed. 
B. Appellants Consented to the Location of the Drive-Through 
Facilities-
Even if the Drive-Through Facilities were not expressly permitted by the Declaration, 
Appellants have consented to their location. Although the trial court did not consider the 
question of Appellants' consent, "it is well established that an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action." First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev.} LC, 2002 UT 56, \ 11, 
52 P.3d 1137 (citations omitted). u[T]his is true even though such ground or theory is not 
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urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court." Id. 
According to the Declaration, except as shown on the Plot Plan, drive-through 
facilities may not be located on Parcel Three 
without the prior written consent of the Owner of Parcel Two and ASPI, 
including consent to the location of the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through 
lanes of such facility. Such consent will not be unreasonably withheld 
provided that the location of such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or 
inhibit access to and from the conduct of business from the buildings in the 
Shopping Center or access to and from the adjacent streets. 
[R. at 38.] While there is nothing in the record to suggest that Appellants ever gave written 
consent to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities, there can be no dispute that 
Appellants gave actual consent. Specifically, the trial court found that the Drive-Through 
Facilities have existed in their present location and configuration since 1982. [R. at 378.] 
Appellants subsequently waited more than 20 years, until 2004, to take exception to the 
location of the Drive-Through Facilities by commencing this action. [R. at 1 -5.] Appellants 
long period of silence and acquiescence can only be interpreted to be the functional 
equivalent of, and amount to, express consent. Having consented to the location of the 
Drive-Through Facilities for so long, Appellants are not, as the trial court concluded, entitled 
to an order requiring their removal. [R. at 380.] 
The trial court's Final Judgment should be affirmed for a similar reason even were 
Appellants not deemed to have consented to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities. 
This is so because, according to the Declaration, Appellants' "consent [to the Drive-Through 
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Facilities] will not be unreasonably withheld provided that the location of such lanes and the 
use thereof do not impede or inhibit access to and from the conduct of business from the 
buildings in the Shopping Center or access to and from the adjacent streets." [R. at 38.] In 
the absence of evidence that the Drive-Through Facilities have "impede[d] or inhibited]" 
access to anything for over 20 years, Appellants could not reasonably withhold their consent 
to the Drive-Through Facilities as presently constituted. Thus, according to the Declaration, 
Appellants' are required to consent to the Drive-Through Facilities despite their recently 
raised objections. 
In sum, the trial court correctly interpreted the Declaration to expressly authorize the 
construction and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location and 
configuration. Even if the Declaration were not so construed, Appellants have consented to 
the location of the Drive-Through Facilities through more than two decades of acquiescence. 
Finally, since the Drive-Through Facilities do not "impede or inhibit" access to the Shopping 
Center, Appellants cannot withhold their consent to the Drive-Through Facilities and they 
are not entitled to remove them. The trial court's Final Judgment should be affirmed for all 
of these reasons. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE 
DECLARATION TO PERMIT THE MENU-BOARD SIGNS 
Like the Drive-Through Facilities themselves, menu-board signs have existed on the 
Wendy's Property as a normal and necessary incident of a drive-through restaurant for many 
years. [R. at 378.] Also like the Drive-Through Facilities, the Menu-Board Signs are 
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expressly permitted by the Declaration, and the trial court was correct to so hold. The trial 
court's approval of the Menu-Board Signs has two bases. First, the trial court correctly held 
that, while the Declaration forbids certain types of signage, it does not forbid menu-board 
signs. [R. at 380,] Second, the trial court concluded that menu-board signs are "an 
inherently necessary feature of modern drive through restaurants" and inasmuch as the 
Declaration expressly permits the operation of a drive-through restaurant on Parcel Three, 
the Declaration necessarily permits the Menu-Board Signs. [R. at 381.] Both of the trial 
court's conclusions were correct. 
A. The Declaration Expressly Permits the Menu-Board Signs* 
Appellants contend that the Declaration forbids the construction and maintenance of 
any more than two "pylon, monument or other free-standing sign[s]" on Parcel Three, where 
the Wendy's Property is located. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 18.] This 
contention is based on a single section of the Declaration, which states that 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct two (2) free-
standing pylon, monument or other signs at the location designated on the Plot 
Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, monument or other free-standing 
sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written approval of 
all Owners . . . . 
[R. at 39-40; 378.] Since it is undisputed that two "pylon, monument or other free-standing 
sign[s]" other than the Menu-Board Signs exist on Parcel Three, Appellants' believe that the 
Declaration forbids the Menu-Board Signs. [R. at 18-20.] 
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Preliminarily, the above-quoted provision of the Declaration only forbids "pylon, 
monument or other free-standing sign[s]," the types of primary signs identifying a business. 
The Declaration does not forbid other types of signs, and, in fact, the Declaration expressly 
permits an unlimited number of "directional signs." [R. at 33.] Although Appellants pay lip 
service to the Court's duty to consider each provision of the Declaration and give effect to 
each, Appellants argument altogether ignores this provision. [See Brief of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 18 (citing Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 
(Utah 1981)).] Whether the Declaration permits or forbids the Menu-Board Signs thus 
resolves to whether such signs are properly considered to be "pylon, monument or other free-
standing sign[s]," or "directional signs." 
The Menu-Board Signs are not "pylon, monument or other free-standing sign[s]." 
"Under the well-established Rile of construction ejusdem generis, general language must be 
confined to its meaning by specific enumeration which proceeds it, unless a contrary 
intention is shown." Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, If 16, 998 P.2d 807 (citations 
omitted). Thus, "in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard 
animal, the general language or any other barnyard animal - despite its seeming breadth -
would probably be held as applying only to four-legged, hoofed mammals (and thus would 
exclude chickens)." Black's Law Dictionary, 218 (New Pocketed. 1996). In this case, under 
the ejusdem generis canon of construction, the general term, "other free-standing sign," 
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includes only signs similar to pylon or monument signs. The Menu-Board Signs are similar 
to neither. 
According to the dictionary, a pylon is a "tall structure erected as a support . . . ." 
Oxford Desk Dictionary and Thesaurus, 648 (American ed. 1997). A monument is defined 
as "anything enduring that serves to commemorate or make celebrated . . . ." Id., at 513. 
While these terms perfectly describe the tall, billboard-type, attention-getting "Wendy's" sign 
to the south of the Wendy's Property along 3300 South, they do not describe the much 
shorter, smaller and less visible Menu-Board Signs. [R. at 209 (photograph taken from 
northeast of the Wendy's Property looking southwest depicting the "Wendy's" pylon sign 
and the Menu-Board Signs).] 
The Menu-Board Signs are properly considered "directional signs," which the 
Declaration expressly permits. Indeed, like all menu-board signs, the Menu-Board Signs 
indicate the direction traffic should travel through the Drive-Through Facilities and provide 
directions about the products Wendy's' customers can order and the manner in which orders 
are to be placed. [R. at 209.] Since the Declaration expressly permits an unlimited number 
of such signs, the trial court's determination that "Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory 
judgment decreeing that the Menu Board Signs may remain in use in their present location 
and configuration" was appropriate and should be affirmed. [R. at 381.] 
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B. Menu-Board Signs are Implicitly Permitted by the Declaration. 
Because the Declaration expressly permits the maintenance of a drive-through 
restaurant on the Wendy's Property, the same document cannot reasonably be interpreted to 
forbid the maintenance of all necessary and normal incidents of such a restaurant. [R. at 38.] 
The trial court correctly found that the Menu-Board Signs are "essential to the operation of 
drive through restaurants" like the restaurant maintained on the Wendy's Property. [R. at 
378.] This fact was undisputed below. [R. at 123, 260-61.] It is also undisputed that the 
Declaration permits the operation of a drive-through restaurant on the Wendy's Property. [R. 
at 38.] Construing the Declaration as Appellants urge to permit a drive-through restaurant 
on the one hand, but forbid the very apparatus necessary to the operation of the restaurant on 
the other, would make the Declaration internally inconsistent and produce a perverse result. 
The Court should, therefore, reject Appellants' interpretation of the Declaration and affirm 
the trial court's Final Judgment. 
III. WENDY'S USE OF THE DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES IS NOT A 
TRESPASS 
For the reasons set forth above in Section I hereof, Wendy's maintenance and use of 
the Drive-Through Facilities in their present location and configuration is expressly permitted 
and authorized by the Declaration. Wendy's is, therefore, not a trespasser and has not 
breached the Declaration. Consequently, whether the statutes of limitation have run with 
respect to Appellants' trespass and breach of contract claims is immaterial and the Court 
need not consider Appellants' argument on those topics. [See Brief of the 
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Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 21 -25 (contending that Wendy's persistent use of the Drive-Through 
Facilities constitutes a continuing trespass on which the statute of limitation has yet to run).] 
Should the Court nonetheless reach Appellants' statutes of limitation argument, the 
trial court correctly held that the limitations periods applicable to Appellants' trespass and 
breach of contract claims expired many years before Appellants commenced this action. [R. 
at 379-80.] Appellants' trespass and breach of contract claims are both based on the same 
pair of circumstances, namely the physical location of the Drive-Through Facilities and 
Wendy's continuing use of the Drive-Through Facilities.2 [R. at 80-81.] As noted 
previously, the physical location of the Drive-Through Facilities and the Menu-Board Signs 
is expressly permitted by the Declaration and, therefore, cannot constitute either a trespass 
or a breach of contract.3 Moreover, as the trial court correctly found, the Drive-Through 
Facilities are "considerably more permanent" than the pile of dirt at issue in Breiggar 
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, If 11, 52 P.3d 1133. [R. at 379.] 
2Appellants make repeated reference to a "new fence" supposedly installed by 
Wendy's on or about the Drive-Through Facilities. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
at 23-24.] There is no evidence in the record, however, to support Appellants' claim that 
Wendy's installed any fence on or about the Wendy's Property. While some fencing is 
evident in one or more of the photographs attached to the affidavit of Steven J. Marshall, 
none of Appellants' affiants mentioned a new fence. [R. at 286-88.] 
3In the event the Court determines that the Menu-Board Signs are not permitted by the 
Declaration, Appellants' causes of action for trespass and breach of contract may not be time-
barred with respect only to Wendy's erection of menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property. 
Appellants' claims with respect to the Drive-Through Facilities, however, would still be 
untimely as they were not asserted until long after the Drive-Through Facilities were 
constructed. 
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With respect to Wendy's continuing use of the Drive-Through Facilities, Appellants 
allege that Wendy's' employees and patrons persistently traverse the Common Area, and that 
Wendy's' agents maintain the landscaping on the traffic island comprising part of the Drive-
Through Facilities. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 23-24.] Appellants' contention 
that these activities constitute trespassing and breaches of contract ignores the indisputable 
fact that the Declaration expressly permits travel over and through the Common Area, and 
the maintenance of structures within the Common Area. 
With respect to vehicular and foot traffic over and about the Common Area, the 
Declaration provides that 
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking, 
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e., the 
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers, 
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business 
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center. 
[R. at 32.] The Declaration further provides that 
Each Owner, as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such Owner, 
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the benefit of each 
of such other Owners and their respective tenants, employees, agents, 
customers and invitees of such tenants, and for the benefit of each parcel 
owned by such grantee, a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each parcel 
owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic and for vehicular parking upon, over and across the Common Area 
within each parcel or parcels owned by the grantor. 
[R. at 34-35.] Thus, vehicular and pedestrian use of the Common Area by Wendy's' 
employees and patrons is not prohibited by the Declaration, but is expressly authorized. 
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Appellants' objection to Wendy's' periodic maintenance of the Drive-Through 
Facilities by mowing and landscaping is unjustified and peculiar for a number of reasons. 
First, as the owners of the Shopping Center, Appellants could reasonably be expected to 
desire activities tending to enhance the appearance of the Common Area and its 
surroundings. Assuming Appellants have such a desire, Wendy's' maintenance activities 
over the years have benefitted Appellants, not harmed them.4 Second, Wendy's' periodic 
occupation of the Drive-Through Facilities for purposes of maintaining the landscaping 
thereon, among other things, is not only permitted by the Declaration, but required. Indeed, 
in relevant part, the Declaration states that "[e]ach owner, at its own expense, shall maintain 
the area designated as Common Area Only on the Plot Plan and located on its parcel at all 
times in good and clean condition and repair . . . ." [R. at 36-37.] Consequently, to the 
extent that Wendy's' employees and agents have occupied or traversed the Drive-Through 
Facilities for purposes of maintaining the same, their doing so was in performance of a duty 
imposed by the Declaration. That performance was neither a trespass nor a breach of the 
Declaration. 
4To the extent that Appellants really do object to Wendy's' mowing, watering and 
landscaping the Drive-Through Facilities, Wendy's would not object to Appellants' assuming 
the responsibility for such activities in the future. 
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IV. WENDY'S IS ENTITLED TO A PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
AGAINST APPELLANTS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE DRIVE-
THROUGH FACILITIES 
The trial court properly enjoined Appellants' interference with Wendy's' use and 
maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs. Appellants are not 
entitled to remove such improvements under any of the theories they advance. 
A. : The Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's injunction. 
At Wendy's' request, the trial court permanently enjoined Appellants from interfering 
with Wendy's use and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and the Menu-Board 
Signs. [R. at 385.] This injunction is entirely appropriate in light of the fact that the 
Declaration expressly permits the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs in their 
present location and configuration. Moreover, the Declaration provides for injunctive relief 
"[i]n the event of any violation or threatened violation of any provision in [the] Declaration 
. . . ." [R. at 16-17.] This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's Final Judgment. 
Appellants assail the trial court's injunction by claiming, in the first place, that the 
trial court's Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment are "internally inconsistent." [See Brief 
of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 25-26.] This is so, Appellants claim, because having 
determined the Drive-Through Facilities to be a an act of trespass, the trial court went on to 
forbid their removal from the Shopping Center. [Id.] The flaw in Appellants' argument is, 
of course, that the trial court did not find or hold that the Drive-Through Facilities amount 
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to a trespass. To the contrary, the trial court held that the Drive-Through Facilities and 
Menu-Board Signs are expressly authorized by the Declaration. [R. at 379-81.] 
Appellants argument is based on a single phrase of the trial court's Conclusions of 
Law, which is taken out of context and twisted. Although the trial court stated in part that 
"the alleged trespass is permanent and has been so since 1982," it is readily apparent that, 
when read in context, the trial court meant only that even if the Drive-Through Facilities and 
Menu-Board Signs did constitute a trespass, the statutes of limitation with respect to actions 
thereon expired long ago. [R. at 379-81.] Again, in no sense did the trial court find or hold 
that the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs constitute a trespass. The trial 
court's enjoining Appellants' interference with the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-
Board Signs was thus justified and should be affirmed. 
B. Appellants are Not Entitled to Remove the Drive-Through 
Facilities or the Menu-Board Signs, 
Appellants go on to contend that they are entitled to remove the Drive-Through 
Facilities and Menu-Board Signs. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 26-28.] This is 
so, Appellants say, because Wendy's cannot maintain permanent improvements pursuant to 
a prescriptive easement and because no property right to any of the Common Area vested in 
Wendy's merely by the running of the statutes of limitation applicable to Appellants' claims. 
ud.] 
Wendy's has never claimed the right to locate the Drive-Through Facilities or Menu-
Board Signs pursuant to a prescriptive easement over the Shopping Center. Rather, 
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Wendy's' counterclaim for recognition of a prescriptive easement was intended only to 
secure the right of Wendy's' patrons, employees and agents to traverse the Common Area 
and the Wendy's Property to make use of and maintain the restaurant thereon. [R. at 22.] 
Wendy's did not seek recognition of an easement with respect to the Drive-Through 
Facilities and Menu-Board Signs themselves because, as explained previously, the 
Declaration expressly permits those improvements to be where they are located. A 
prescriptive easement is unnecessary because the Declaration grants an express easement. 
Likewise, Wendy's does not claim to have acquired any manner of ownership interest 
in the Shopping Center by virtue of the running of the statutes of limitation applicable to 
Appellants' claims. The acquisition of such an interest is entirely unnecessary because the 
Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs are permitted by the plain language of the 
Declaration and the express easements granted thereby. Appellants are not, therefore, at 
liberty to interfere with or remove either the Drive-Through Facilities or the Menu-Board 
Signs. 
V. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS5 FEES 
The trial court properly ordered Appellants to pay Wendy's' costs and attorneys' fees 
in this action based on the plain language of the Declaration. In relevant part, the Declaration 
states that 
In the event that legal proceedings are brought or commenced to enforce any 
of the terms of this Declaration against any Owner or other party with an 
interest in the Shopping Center, the successful party in such action shall then 
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be entitled to receive and shall receive from the defaulting Owner or party a 
reasonable sum as attorneys' fee and costs, to be fixed by the court in the same 
action. 
[R. at 47.] As the prevailing party below, Wendy's was entitled to an award of costs and 
attorneys' fees, and the trial court's grant of such an award should be affirmed. In addition, 
the trial court's award should be augmented by the amount of Wendy's' attorneys' fees on 
appeal. See Edwards' Pet Supply v. Bentley, 652 P.2d 889, 890 (Utah 1982) (approving 
augmentation of trial court's attorneys' fee award for fees incurred on appeal). This Court 
should thus remand this action to the trial court for a determination of that amount. Id. 
Appellants suggest that the trial court erred in awarding Wendy's its costs and 
attorneys' fees for two reasons. First, Appellants argue that under the Declaration, attorneys' 
fees and costs can only be recovered from a "defaulting owner or party." [See Brief of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29.] Since Appellants are not in default of their obligations under 
the Declaration, so their argument goes, they cannot be ordered to pay Wendy's' costs and 
attorneys' fees. [Id.] Second, Appellants contend that Wendy's' failure to allocate its 
attorneys' fees among the separate claims at issue precludes an award of fees and costs. 
Appellants are wrong in both cases, and the Court should affirm the trial court's award. 
A, The Trial Court's Construction and Application of the 
Declaration's Attorneys' Fee Provision was Correct. 
Appellants' argument that, because they did not breach the Declaration, they cannot 
be liable for Wendy's' attorneys' fees and costs, is raised for the first time on appeal and 
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consequently must be rejected. Even if the Court were to consider Appellants' argument, 
however, the argument fails because Appellants are, in fact, in default of the Declaration. 
1. Appellants Waived Their Textual Argument by Failing to Raise 
it Below. 
It is well-settled in Utah that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ffl[ 50-51, 99 P.3d 801 
(quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14, 48 P.3d 968). 
Appellants' suggestion that the language of the Declaration's attorneys' fee provision 
precludes an award in Wendy's' favor is raised for the first time before this Court. As such, 
Appellants' argument must be disregarded. 
In their Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and 
Affidavit and Award of Attorneys' Fees, Appellants argued that the trial court's award of 
attorneys' fees in Wendy's' favor was improper for only two reasons. First, Appellants 
suggested that inasmuch as the trial court determined that their claims were barred by the 
applicable statutes of limitation, the trial court had not rendered a decision on the merits and 
an award of attorneys' fees was, therefore, inappropriate. [R. at 355.] Second, Appellants 
argued, as they have on appeal, that Wendy's' failure to allocate its attorneys' fees between 
compensable and non-compensable claims precluded an award. [Id.] Appellants did not 
argue or suggest that an award of attorneys' fees was otherwise improper. Certainly, 
Appellants never contended that an award was inappropriate because they were not a 
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"defaulting owner or party." Having failed to raise this argument below, Appellants may not 
raise it on appeal. 
2. Appellants Are in Default of the Declaration. 
Appellants' contention that they are not a "defaulting owner or party" within the 
meaning of the Declaration is wrong. [See Brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29.] Implicit 
in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment is the correct 
determination that Appellants' bringing suit against Wendy's to collect damages for the 
existence of, and to eliminate the presence of, improvements that are expressly permitted by 
the Declaration and that have remained in place, unchallenged, for more than two decades 
constituted a breach or "default" of the Declaration. [R. at 375-87.] While Appellants' 
conduct may not fall within a strict, legalistic definition of the word "default," the term is 
certainly susceptible to an interpretation that would encompass the assertion of baseless, 
untimely claims. For this reason, the trial court's Final Judgment should be affirmed. 
B. Wendy's Was Not Required to Allocate its Attorneys' Fees Among 
Claims. 
Wendy's was not, as Appellants state, required to "allocate the fees it [requested] 
among the separate causes of action or claims pursued in the litigation." [Brief of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29.] The case Appellants cite as the basis for their argument, Brown 
v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109,978 P.2d 470, does not say what Appellants 
claim it says. Rather than requiring an attorneys' fee claimant to allocate such fees among 
"the separate causes of action or claims pursued," Brown actually requires an allocation of 
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attorneys' fees between "compensable and non-compensable claims." Brown, 1999UTApp 
109, H 15 (citing Cottonwood Mall Co, v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)). Where, 
as here, there are no "non-compensable claims," or "where the proof of a compensable claim 
and otherwise non-compensable claim are closely related and require proof of the same 
facts," no allocation is either possible or necessary. Brown, 1999 UT App 109, f 20 (citing 
First General Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). 
As noted, no non-compensable claims were either asserted or litigated in this case. 
All three of the causes of action asserted in Appellants' Amended Complaint were based on 
the Declaration. [R. at 363-64.] Appellants' first cause of action alleged trespass based on 
Wendy's' allegedly improper occupation of the Common Area as that term is defined by the 
Declaration. [R. at 81.] Second, Appellants alleged a breach of the Declaration by virtue of 
Wendy's' maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities, and finally Appellants claimed that 
the Menu-Board Signs violated the Declaration. [R. at 81-82.] Since all three of Appellants' 
claims were based on the Declaration, and Wendy's prevailed with respect to each of those 
claims, there were no non-compensable claims to which Wendy's could or should have 
allocated any portion of its attorneys' fees and costs. There was, therefore, no need for the 
trial court to force Wendy's to allocate its attorneys' fees and costs. 
To the extent that Appellants' contend that any of the relief afforded by the trial court 
was not based on the Declaration, and was consequently not "compensable," Appellants are 
mistaken. [See brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, at 29 (opining that Wendy's' award of 
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attorneys' fees was "especially troubling" because the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were broader than its Minute Entry granting Wendy's' motion for 
summary judgment).] In fact, all of the relief provided by the trial court's Final Judgment 
was rooted in the Declaration. [R. at 384-87.] Specifically, the trial court determined that: 
(1) the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs are permitted by the Declaration and 
may remain in place; (2) Appellants are enjoined from interfering with Wendy's' use and 
maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs; and (3) Wendy's is 
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. [Id.] As noted previously herein, the 
Declaration expressly provides for both injunctive relief and attorneys' fee awards. [R. at 
45-47.] There is thus no merit to Appellants' contention that any portion of the trial court's 
award of attorneys' fees and costs in Wendy's' favor was for non-compensable claims. This 
Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's award. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the trial court's Final Judgment for all of the foregoing 
reasons. In addition, the Court should remand this action to the trial court for a determination 
of the attorneys' fees incurred by Wendy's in connection with this appeal with instructions 
to augment the trial court's prior award of attorneys' fees by such amount. 
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